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Abstract
This paper studies the relationship between the probability of devaluation of the Brazilian real and the
fundamentals of the economy for the period 1995-1998.  We use a model of a fixed exchange rate
system that allows for multiple equilibria and, therefore, makes possible the identification of self-
fulfilling speculation.  The devaluation probability is computed using the "drift adjustment method".
The model performs satisfactorily in tracking monthly devaluation expectations and presents some
important advantages over a simple linear regression of macroeconomic variables on the devaluation
probability.  We do not find evidence that self-fulfilling speculation was at work in the period preceding
the Brazilian currency crisis of January 1999.  This suggests that the breakdown of the Brazilian
managed exchange rate system was due to the deterioration of the fundamentals of the economy.
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1.  Introduction
The 1990s have provided substantial incentive for the study of currency crises.  The decade started with
the ERM
1 crisis of 1992-93 which was followed by crises in Mexico (1994), Asia (1997), Russia (1998),
and more recently in Brazil (1999).
2  Among other possible costs, currency crises might delay the
process of policy reform and jeopardize the confidence of international agents in the country's
institutions.  Fortunately, some researchers believe that currency crises have a significant predictable
component and that early-warning systems might be developed in order to reduce their occurrence.
3
Two main approaches can be distinguished in the academic literature on currency crises.
4  The  fi rst
became known as "first-generation" or speculative-attack models of currency crisis and was due to the
seminal paper of Krugman (1979)
 and its extensions.
5  In Krugman's model, a fixed exchange rate
system becomes unsustainable due to the constant deterioration of the fundamentals.  A speculative
attack occurs when the government's reserves fall below a certain critical level.  The crisis is therefore
unavoidable and its timing predictable.  The mechanical way in which the government prints money and
the central bank sells reserves is one of the main focus of criticisms to the Krugman's model.
The so-called "second-generation" models try to tackle these issues.  In these models, there is a conflict
between the government's incentives to defend and to abandon the fixed exchange rate.  Furthermore,
the cost to defend a fixed rate increases with the market expectations of devaluation.  This gives some
support for the self-fulfilling view of speculation, since high devaluation expectations can validate
themselves by making it more costly for the government to defend the fixed exchange rate system.
6
                                                  
1 Exchange Rate Mechanism in the European Monetary System.
2 The occurrence of currency crises was also significant in other periods.  Esquivel and Larraín (1998) study a sample of 30 countries and find
that during the period of 1976-95 at least two currency crises occurred per year.  The peaks in the number of crises occurred in 1976 (following
the collapse of the Bretton Woods system), 1982 (due to the debt crisis in Latin America), and 1992 (due to the instability in the European
Monetary System).  Latin American countries had the largest number of currency crises.
3 Esquivel and Larraín (1998).
4 See Flood and Marion (1998) for a review of the recent currency crises literature.
5 Flood and Garber (1984), for instance, use simplified linear models to study the breakdown of fixed exchange regimes.  Obstfeld (1986)
shows that speculative attacks might be self-fulfilling and crises might occur even when the fundamentals are consistent with the fixed
exchange rate.
6 Krugman (1996) questions the theoretical robustness of the self-fulfilling view by presenting a second-generation model that does not give
rise to multiple equilibria.3
The reasons to defend a currency might be associated with, for instance, the belief that a fixed rate
facilitates international trade and investment, or serves to improve the credibility of countries with a
high-inflation history.  The reasons to abandon it might be linked to a large debt burden denominated in
domestic currency or to the government's desire to adopt a more expansionary monetary policy due to
high levels of unemployment.
7  These models are also called "cost-benefit" models since the government
can freely choose to devalue the currency if the benefits of doing so outweigh the costs.
One characteristic of these models is the attempt to determine whether a currency can be attacked
without a justifiable deterioration in the fundamentals.  Some models identify an intermediate range for
the fundamentals where a crisis may or may not occur.  Other models suggest a less important role for
the fundamentals.  In these models, a crisis may occur as a consequence of pure speculation against the
currency.  This might be caused, for instance, by herding behavior or due to contagion effects.
Jeanne (1997) proposes a model in which both the fundamental and self-fulfilling speculation might play
a role in the emergence of currency crisis.  Self-fulfilling speculation is possible when the structural
parameters of the economy allow for multiple equilibria in market expectations and when the
fundamental of the economy lies within a certain range.  If multiple equilibria are not possible, market
expectations are uniquely determined and their value depend on the level of the fundamental.  The
application of this model to the French franc crisis of 1992-93 generated interesting empirical results.
In this paper, we apply Jeanne's model to the Brazilian managed exchange rate system in effect from
March 1995 until December 1998.  Our main purpose is to determine the relationship between the
fundamental and the devaluation probability during this period.  In this way, we hope to better
understand the causes of the currency crisis of January 1999.  The data seems appropriate for the study
since it includes two episodes of speculative attack in which there was no change in the exchange rate
system and it covers a total period of almost four years.
                                                  
7 See Obstfeld (1994, 1996).4
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  The model proposed by Jeanne (1997) is presented
in the next section and its estimation is described in Section 3.  We estimate the model for the Brazilian
experience and analyze its results in Section 4.  Section 5 concludes the paper.
2.  The Model
In this section, we present the model of currency crises proposed by Jeanne (1997).  The model
represents a country with a fixed exchange rate in which the government decides at each point in time
whether or not to defend the peg.  The decision depends on two factors: the state (or "mood") of the
government and the net benefit it receives by keeping the peg.  If the government is in a "tough" mood it
will defend the currency at all costs and we assume the peg is maintained.  On the other hand, if the
government is in a "soft" mood it will defend the peg only if the benefits of doing so outweigh the costs.
Although the mood of the government is not predictable (since it might depend on political factors), it is
perfectly observable by the private sector.  We assume that the probability of the government being in a
"soft" mood is equal to µ and in a "tough" mood equal to (1-µ)
8.  The expression for the net benefit of
keeping the peg has a central role in this model.  It is assumed to be of the following form:
1 t t t b B - ap - = (1) 
The first term (bt) represents the gross benefit of the fixed peg and it corresponds to the benefit obtained
when the peg is perfectly credible.  It is an exogenous variable that summarizes the economic situation
of the country based on macroeconomic variables and is represented by:
t t 1 t t b E b e + = -
where Et represents the time t expectations operator and we assume the innovation  t e  to be
independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.), characterized by a continuous and symmetric density
function ) ( f × , and strictly increasing (decreasing) in  ) 0 , (-¥   )) , 0 (( +¥ .
                                                  
8 This is in contrast to most models of fixed exchange rate system in which it is assumed that the government is always in a "soft" mood (µ=1).5
The second term ( 1 t- p ) in Eq.(1) represents the probability that the currency will be devalued at time t
by a certain amount d.  This probability is evaluated by the private sector at time t-1.
9  Equation (1)
represents, in fact, the logic of self-fulfilling speculation in second-generation models where the
policymaker's decision of whether or not to keep the peg is affected by devaluation expectations.
10
As mentioned before, the currency will be devalued if the government is in a "soft" mood and the net
benefit of keeping the fixed peg at t+1 is negative.  This allows us to express the probability of
devaluation in the current period as:
[] 0 B ob Pr 1 t t t < m = p +
From Eq. (1) and (2), we can express the condition  0 B 1 t < +  as  1 t t t 1 t b E + + - ap < e  which gives:
[] 1 t t t 1 t t b E ob Pr + + - ap < e m = p
Due to the characteristics of e , one can rewrite this expression in terms of the cumulative distribution of
) ( f × .  Although not necessary at this point (see Jeanne 1997), we assume already that  ) ( f ×  has a normal
distribution with mean zero, standard deviation s , a and cumulative distribution represented by  ) ( F × s .
This gives rise to the main equation of this model, being:
) ( F t t t f - ap m = p s (2) 
where  t f  ( 1 t tb E + = ) represents all the economic variables that are relevant for the determination of the
devaluation probability and is denominated the "fundamental" of the economy.  Observing Eq.(2), one
can see that the maximum value for the devaluation probability is equal to m  since the maximum of the
cumulative distribution function  s F  is equal to one.  Jeanne (1997) shows that the number of solutions
for this equation depends on the following parameter:
                                                  
9 The timing with which devaluation expectations affect the policymaker's decision seems to play an important role in second generation
models.  Krugman (1996) shows that if this decision is affected by devaluation expectations formed in the current period and if the fundamental
deteriorates deterministically multiple equilibria do not arise.  Jeanne and Masson (1998) analyze a similar case in which the net benefit
depends on the current devaluation probability (Bt = bt - a pt).  They find that depending on certain conditions for the fundamental an arbitrarily
number of equilibria may arise.  They also show that when the net benefit depends on both the current and lagged devaluation probabilities,
devaluation probabilities are in general not uniquely determined and might present a cyclic or chaotic dynamics.
10 Obstfeld (1994) shows how this decision might be affected by the level of unemployment.  Jeanne (1997) also uses a similar case as one way






Multiple equilibria not possible.  If  1 z £  the devaluation probability is uniquely determined and
decreases with the fundamental f (see Fig.1 for the case when  1 z < ).  The slope of the curve in Fig.1
can be interpreted as the degree of responsiveness of the market to a change in the fundamental of the
economy.  It reaches a maximum at the inflection point where  m = f = p 5 . 0 int po . inf int po . inf .  Assuming
that the parameter a is equal to one (a necessary condition for the identification of the other parameters











For practical purposes, we define a certain critical range for the fundamental in which the change in
market expectations is greater than the change in the fundamental, i.e., the slope of the curve in Fig.1 is
greater than one in absolute value.  The demonstration of these results and the equations used to
compute the frontiers of the critical range are presented in the Appendix.
INSERT FIGURE 1
Multiple equilibria possible.  When  1 z >  the devaluation probability may assume three different
values within the interval ( f f, )(see Fig.2).  The possibility of self-fulfilling speculation therefore exists
if 1 z > .  Outside the mentioned range, the devaluation probability is uniquely determined.
11
INSERT FIGURE 2
Currency crisis.  In this model, a currency crisis is identified when the devaluation probability suddenly
increases to unusually high levels.  This might happen in two cases: (i) Due to a decrease in the
                                                  
11 For the computation of the range ( f f, ), see Jeanne (1997).7
fundamental alone ( 1 z £ ); or  (ii) due to self-fulfilling speculation.  This might occur if  1 z > , the
fundamental is between the range ( f f, ) in Fig.2, and the devaluation probability jumps from a low to a
high level ( ) ( 1 f p  to  ) ( 2 f p  or  ) ( 3 f p ).  Although we characterize the crisis as caused by self-fulfilling
speculation, the fundamental also plays its role since it must be between the mentioned range.  The
actual jump in the devaluation probability is, however, caused by the "animal spirits" of the market.
These might be determined by a number of different sunspot variables
12, like the behavior of important
market participants or the arrival of good and bad news.
3.  Estimation
The estimation of the model is done using the maximum likelihood method.  The three main equations
used in the estimation are as follows:
t
'
t x g = f (3) 
) ˆ ( F ˆ t t t f - p m = p s (4) 
t t t ˆ h + p = p (5) 
In Eq.(3), we define the fundamental as a linear function of relevant macroeconomic variables and a
constant (represented by the vector  t x ).  The coefficients of this function are included in the vector  ' g .
The main equation of our model (Eq.(2)) is represented in Eq.(4) (with a normalized to 1).  Finally,
Eq.(5) states that the observed (or inferred) devaluation probability is equal to its estimated value plus a
prediction error  t h , assumed to be normally distributed with variance 
2
h s .  The devaluation probability
at each period ( t p ) is computed based on the "drift adjustment method" proposed by Svensson
(1993a).
13  This method suggests that the expected depreciation within the band should be estimated and
then subtracted from the interest rate differential.
For the case of multiple equilibria ( 1 z >  and  ) , ( f f Î f ), we need to define a variable st as the state (1, 2,
or 3) at time t corresponding to the branches 1, 2, or 3, respectively, as shown in Fig.2.  We assume that
                                                  
12 Sunspot variables are said to be those variables which coordinate the expectation of foreign exchange market participants.8
the selection mechanism between states follows a Markov process independent of the fundamental.
Observing the characteristic of branch 2 in Fig.2, we note that the devaluation probability increases with
the fundamental.  Since this is rather counterintuitive, we exclude state 2 (branch 2) as a possible state.
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where ) j , i ( q  are the probabilities of transition from state i to state j when the fundamental is between
the range  ) , ( f f .  The maximum likelihood method is used in order to estimate the parameters g, m, and
s (or z), and the sequence of states 
T
1 t t) s ( = , based on the macroeconomic variables 
T
1 t t) x ( =  and on the
devaluation probability 
T
1 t t) ( = p .
4.  The Brazilian Experience
In this section, we apply the model outlined in Sections 2 and 3 to the Brazilian real
14 for the period in
which this currency was subjected to a managed exchange rate system (March 1995 - December 1998).
Our main purposes are: (i) To check for the presence of self-fulfilling speculation during the mentioned
period; (ii) To study the relationship between the fundamental of the economy and the devaluation
probability; and (iii) To determine the significant macroeconomic variables among those chosen to
constitute the fundamental.
The Brazilian real was created as part of an economic stabilization program (the Real Plan
15)
implemented in July 1994.  The government's main objective was to achieve price stability after having
experienced hyperinflation from 1988 until 1994 (it reached its peak in 1993 at a level of approximately
2700%).
16  At its creation, the real was at parity with the dollar.  Although there was no law fixing this
                                                                                                                                                                 
13 See also Bertola and Svensson (1993), Rose and Svensson (1994), and Thomas (1994).
14 We use italics to avoid confusion with the word real.
15 See Dornbusch (1997) for a historical perspective and a more detailed discussion of the Real Plan.
16 The adoption of fixed exchange rates as means for price stability is controversial.  Svensson (1993b) points to the inherent unsustainability of
fixed exchange rates and stresses its ineffectiveness as means to obtain price stability.  Sachs, Tornell and Velasco (1996) also point out that
pegged exchange rates might increase a country's vulnerability to speculative attacks.  They do suggest, however, that pegging might be9
parity with the dollar, the Central Bank announced a floor for the value of the currency at this level.  The
increase in capital flows caused an appreciation of the real by almost 20 percent (no limit was placed on
currency appreciation; see Fig.3).  This resulted in trade problems and on 06 March 1995 the
government introduced an exchange rate system based on bands.  It also announced that it would adopt a
"crawling peg" system that would allow the currency to depreciate at a rate of approximately 7½ percent
per year.  The exchange rate and the bands set from this date until December 1998 are shown in Fig.3.
From July 1994 until December 1998 the real suffered three speculative attacks.  The first one came in
the wake of the Mexican crisis of 1995, the second came in October 1997 in the period after the
beginning of the Asian crisis, and the third in the fourth quarter of 1998 during the Russian crisis.  One
could argue that these crises can be seen as a possible sunspot coordination variable.  In all cases, the
main policy adopted to defend the currency was to increase interest rates and to make use of
international reserves (see Fig.4 and 5f, respectively).
Due to an increase in the expectations of a currency devaluation, the government and the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) agreed by December 1998 on a US$41.5 billion program to help Brazil to avoid a
possible devaluation.  The pressure on the exchange rate market increased substantially at the beginning
of 1999 and by mid-January the government decided to float the exchange rate. Two months later, the
real had been devalued by approximately 45% relative to its value at the beginning of the year.
INSERT FIGURES 3 AND 4
Macroeconomic Data
We use monthly data from March 1995 to December 1998.  The variables included in the representation
of the fundamental of the Brazilian economy are: real exchange rate, unemployment, trade balance gross
domestic product (GDP) ratio, inflation, government finance GDP ratio, and international reserves
17.
                                                                                                                                                                 
important in the early stages of stabilization programs.  For the aftermath of stabilization, these authors recommend the use of a flexible
crawling peg.
17 We have used the natural logarithms of the real exchange rate and international reserves in the computations.  With the exception of the
unemployment level (obtained from the Brazilian Institute for Geography and Statistics), we use data from the International Financial Statistics
(IFS).10
We believe, as suggested by Jeanne (1997), that the inclusion of political variables in the definition of
the fundamental could, in general, improve the performance of the model in explaining the probability
of devaluation.  The main difficulty lies in the definition of such variables in a way that avoids the trap
of explaining all the observations based on ad hoc dummy political variables.  One natural candidate
would be the conduct of elections.  In the Brazilian case, the elections at the end of 1998 might, in fact,
have influenced agents' expectations regarding a change in the exchange rate policy adopted by the
government.  This variable was not included due to the lack of observations after the event (only one).
Figure 5a shows the overvaluation with respect to the dollar suffered by the real since its creation.
18
This overvaluation achieved a maximum of almost 30% in July 1996
19 and was approximately equal to
19% at the end of 1998.
20  The upward trend in unemployment can be seen in Fig.5b.  Figure 5c shows
that the trade balance GDP ratio has been consistently negative since mid-1996 with a slightly declining
trend.  Figure 5d shows a clearly declining inflation since the implementation of the Real Plan, being
close to zero by the end of 1998.  The government finance GDP ratio can be seen in Fig.5e.  It has been
negative (public deficit) most of the time and shows a slightly declining trend.  Finally, the level of
international reserves is presented in Fig.5f.
Devaluation Probability
The devaluation probability 
T
1 t t) ( = p  is derived assuming that during the period studied there was no real
realignment of the central parity since the government announced in advance the use of a "crawling peg"
system.  This means we compute the exchange rate within the band in relation to a fixed central parity.
We use the central parity of the second band established by the government (equal to 0.905R$/US$)
since the first one was valid for only four days.  For the interest rates, we use the Brazilian and
American three-month money market rates.  We also assume that the expected size of the devaluation
was equal to 25%.  This value was based on the average devaluation size necessary to bring the real
exchange rate back to the value of one.  The devaluation probability is shown in Fig.8 (curve "inferred").
                                                  
18 The real exchange rate is computed based on the consumer prices of Brazil and USA (IFS line 64).  A decrease in this index corresponds to a
real appreciation of the real.
19 According to Dornbusch (1997), by 1996, the real appreciation was between 3 and 76 percent depending on the measure used.11
INSERT FIGURE 5 (A) TO (F)
Empirical Results
We present the results of the estimation in Table 1, together with the results of a linear regression of the
selected macroeconomic variables on the devaluation probability.  The linear regression might also be
seen as the estimation of the model presented earlier with Eq.(4) being replaced by  t t ˆ f = p .
The value of 0.9 obtained for the parameter z indicates that the devaluation probability is uniquely
determined for all values of the fundamental ( 1 z < ).  Since multiple equilibria are not possible, we can
exclude the possibility of self-fulfilling speculation during the period studied.  The estimated value for m
indicates that the government was in a "soft" mood during approximately 19% of the time.
For the non-linear case (Jeanne’s model), the expected signs for the coefficients of the macroeconomic
variables are determined by their expected influence on the fundamental f (see Eq.(3)).  We expect,
therefore, a positive sign for the coefficients of real exchange rate, trade balance GDP ratio, government
finance GDP ratio, and reserves, since the fundamental should be increasing with these variables.  The
opposite is expected for the levels of unemployment and inflation.  In the linear case, the expected signs
for the coefficients are determined based on their influence on the devaluation probability (in this case
t t x ' ˆ g = p ).  The expected signs are, therefore, opposite to those assigned in the case of Jeanne's model.
Table 1 shows that, for the non-linear case, the level of international reserves is the only variable that is
significant and has the expected sign.  This points to the importance of this variable in the determination
of the fundamental of the Brazilian economy.  A similar result is obtained with the linear regression.  In
this case, however, the level of inflation is also significant (with the right sign) and the real exchange
rate and the trade balance GDP ratio are significant at 10% level but with the wrong sign.
                                                                                                                                                                 
20 Goldfajn and Valdés (1996) study a sample of 93 countries from 1960 until 1994 and conclude that it is relatively unlikely to undo
appreciations greater than 25%.12
The evolution of the estimated fundamental can be seen in Fig.7.  Fig.9 shows the separate contribution
of each macroeconomic variable in the composition of the fundamental.  One can see clearly the
importance of the level of international reserves in this composition, in accordance with the empirical
results presented in Table 1.  Observing Fig.7, we see that the fundamentals of the Brazilian economy
were within this critical range for the entire period analyzed.  This points to the vulnerability of the
currency to changes in the fundamental.
Figure 8 shows that both models perform reasonably well in tracking the general trend of monthly
devaluation expectations.
21  By visual inspection, though, it does not seem obvious which model
performs better. Examining the loglikelihoods, we can see that the non-linear model performs better than
the linear regression.  However, since these are non-nested models, we cannot apply a LR test to assess
the significance of the difference in the performance of the two models.
Comparison
Although we mentioned that the linear regression performed almost as well as Jeanne's model, we
should stress that the latter still contains some important advantages over the linear model.  First, it
makes possible the identification of self-fulfilling speculation.  Second, it allows us to compute the level
of the fundamental and monitor its value with respect to a certain critical range.  Third, the model
always provides a value for the devaluation probability between the range zero and one.  It defines, in
fact, a maximum for the devaluation probability equal to m.  This is not the case in a linear regression
where unusual values for a macroeconomic variable could lead to values above one or negative.  The
main advantage of the linear regression is the fact that it is simple and straightforward to estimate.
Besides, we expect Jeanne’s model to present a higher performance in cases with multiple equilibria.
INSERT TABLE 1
INSERT FIGURES 6 TO 9
                                                  
21 The probability of the currency not being devalued in the following n months is equal to ()
n 1 p - .  This means that for a devaluation
probability equal to 16%, for example, there is a 12% chance that the currency will not be devalued in the following year.13
5.  Conclusion
We have used a model of a fixed exchange rate system that allows for multiple equilibria to study the
relation between the probability of devaluation of the Brazilian real and the fundamental of the
economy.  We have focused on the period from March 1995 until December 1998 during which the
currency was subjected to a managed exchange rate system.  We have shown that the structural
parameters of the economy did not allow for the presence of multiple equilibria.  There is, therefore, no
evidence of self-fulfilling speculation during the period studied.  This leads us to conclude that the
Brazilian currency crisis of January 1999 was caused by a deterioration of the fundamental.
It was also shown that the model performs quite well in predicting devaluation expectations.  Although
its performance is apparently not significantly better than the linear regression, we were able to show
some important advantages of this model. Furthermore, we expect the performance of the model to be
superior to the linear regression in cases where multiple equilibria are possible, as in Jeanne (1997).
In the Brazilian case, we showed that the fundamental was within a defined critical range for almost the
entire period analyzed.  This indicates the vulnerability of the Brazilian real with respect to changes in
the fundamental.  The level of international reserves was found to be the only significant
macroeconomic variable in the representation of the fundamental for which the expected sign was
obtained.  This points to the importance of this variable in the policy adopted by the government to
defend the currency in periods of crises.14
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Appendix
In order to compute the degree of responsiveness of the market to a change in the fundamental of the
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It is interesting to know for what value of the fundamental this variation is maximum.  In other words, at
what point the market reacts most strongly to a change in the fundamental.  We should, then, compute








.  This condition is satisfied at the
inflection point of the curves in Fig.1.  Taking the derivative of Eq.(A1) yields:
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22 This analysis is not included in Jeanne (1997).17












.  We assume now that a=1.  As mentioned
before, this is a necessary condition for the identification of the other parameters of the model.  Under
this assumption, the second condition is not possible since the slopes of the curves in Fig.1 is always
negative.  So, we need to find the value for f that satisfies the first condition.  Due to the characteristics
of ) ( f × , this happens at the point zero, or when  p = f .  Returning to our Eq.(2), with a=1
() ( F f - p m = p s ), we have that at this point the cumulative distribution function  s F  is equal to 0.5.  So,
the inflection point happens when:
m = f = p 5 . 0 int po . inf int po . inf
We can now compute the slope of the curve at the inflection point.  Making  p = f  in Eq.(A1) and
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In order to compute the bounds of the critical range, we first add f to both sides of Eq.(2) and obtain:
f + f - p m = f + p s ) ( F
or ) ( ) ( F f - p - f - p m = f s (A3)
We make now Eq.(A1) equal to  1 - :
1
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) ( f
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2
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1 slope (A4)18
Substituting the positive value resulting from Eq.(A4) ( f > p , the point is to the left of the inflection
point) in Eq.(A3) gives us the lower bound (RL) of the critical range which includes the points with a
slope higher than one in absolute value.  The upper bound (RU) is obtained using the negative value
resulting from Eq.(A4).19











Figure 1. Devaluation probability vs. fundamental for  1 z <20













Range with multiple equilibria
inflection point p2(f)
Figure 2. Devaluation probability vs. fundamental for  1 z >21







































































































































































Source: IFS (line 60b), monthly data.
Vertical dashed line: start of "crawling peg" system


























































































































Source: IFS (lines rf, 64 Brazil, 64 USA)
(a) Real exchange rate (July 1
st,1994=1)


































































































































Source: IFS (lines 70d, 71vd, 99b, and rf)
(c) Monthly trade balance/GDP ratio





































































































































Source: IFS (lines 80 and 99b)
(e) Monthly government finance/GDP ratio
Source: IFS (line 11d)
(f) International reserves (total reserves minus gold)
Figure 5. Macroeconomic data, July 1994 - Dec. 1998, monthly data
Vertical dashed line: start of "crawling peg" system24
Table 1. Empirical Results







Ln RER + 0.02621 - 0.25771*
Unemployment - 0.0004827 + -0.0025048
Trade balance/GDP + -0.01340 - 0.07580*
Inflation - -0.0005685 + 0.0150290**
Gov.finance/GDP + -0.00353 - 0.01155
Ln Reserves + 0.042969*** - -0.122406***
Ln L 131.07 126.25
z ( 1 z : H0 = ) 0.9046***
m (prob. gov. "soft" mood) 0.1865
s 0.08224
* significant at 10% level.
** significant at 5% level.
*** significant at 1% level.
1 The high non-linearity of the problem imposes difficulties in the determination of the standard errors of the estimated
coefficients.  The significance of the coefficients is then estimated based on the Likelihood Ratio (LR) which is equal to
) L ln L (ln 2 LR R - - = .  The terms  R L ln  and  L ln  represent the maximum log-likelihood of the constrained and
unconstrained estimates, respectively.
Note: Real exchange rate (July 1
st, 1994=1); Unemployment (%); Monthly trade balance GDP ratio (%); Monthly inflation (%);















Figure 6. Probability of devaluation vs. fundamental - Brazilian case
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(e) Gov.finance/GDP (b) ln Reserves
Figure 9. Componentes of the estimated fundamental, March 1995 - Dec. 1998 
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